Sambor Kane

Take the treasure. Leave the dogma.

Author: Sambor

  • Half a Stoic Sentence

    An archery target with arrows close to the centre, a bow leaning beside it, in a stone niche

    The most quoted idea in Stoicism is also the easiest to misuse, and it’s possible to misuse it for years without noticing.

    It comes from the first page of the Handbook of Epictetus, a former slave who taught philosophy in the first and second centuries. Some things are up to us, he says, and some are not. Up to us are our own judgements, our choices, what we aim at and what we turn away from. Not up to us are our bodies, our property, our reputations, our positions.

    The usual way to read this goes: that’s not up to me, so never mind. The job, the diagnosis, the person who stopped calling. Not up to me. Next.

    That is half a sentence. The Stoics were not people who sat back. Marcus Aurelius ran an empire and fought a war; Seneca wrote, advised, argued and invested. The distinction wasn’t there to excuse anyone from anything. It was there to put the effort in the right place. What is up to you, you’re responsible for completely, without excuses. What isn’t, you stop torturing yourself about, so that you have something left for the first list.

    In practice, most of what keeps people awake at half past three in the morning lands awkwardly between Epictetus’ two lists. So modern writers on Stoicism often add a third. I find it works best with a pencil and three columns:

    Control. Things you actually do: your actions, your words, your effort, your response once the first jolt has passed.

    Influence. Things your actions affect but don’t decide: whether you get the job, what someone thinks of you, whether they forgive you.

    Neither. Things that will happen whatever you do: the economy, the weather, your age, decisions made in rooms you’ll never enter.

    The first column says: act, fully. The third says: stop rehearsing it. The middle one is the hard one, and Cicero left a good image for it. A Stoic in one of his dialogues describes an archer, whose real aim is to do everything that makes a good shot. Hitting the target is preferred and worked for, but once the arrow leaves the bow, it isn’t his any more. Do your part completely. Hold the result loosely.

    Seneca added one more tool, and it’s the only useful thing to do with the third column. Imagine the thing you fear, calmly and specifically, and ask what you would actually do if it happened. It sounds like a way to make worry worse. Often it does the opposite. Fear feeds on vagueness: what if it all goes wrong? Specifics shrink it: if I lose the job, I have this much money for this long, and I’ll do these three things. A disaster with a plan attached is still frightening. A disaster without one goes round and round all night.

    Two warnings. Do the rehearsal once, on paper, and finish with what you’d do; if it turns into a loop, stop. And if what keeps coming back is harming yourself, don’t rehearse it at all. Talk to someone today. In the UK, Samaritans answer on 116 123, day and night. And if what sits in the third column is a person who frightens you, the first column has one entry before all the others: getting safe.

    The columns are tidy on paper and messy in life. Your health sits partly in all three. That’s fine. The point isn’t perfect sorting. It’s to stop treating every worry as if it were equally urgent and equally yours.

    Try it tonight. Rule three columns. Empty your head onto them. Then look at the first column, the one that’s easiest to leave blank, and do one thing in it tomorrow.

    This note comes from Chapter 8 of ARRR, which takes the Stoics’ question and leaves the rest of their system behind.

    Sources. Epictetus, Handbook (Enchiridion) §1, trans. W. A. Oldfather, Loeb Classical Library [source]. William B. Irvine, A Guide to the Good Life (2009), where the third list is called the “trichotomy of control” [interpretation]; the three columns are this note’s. Cicero, On Ends III.22, trans. H. Rackham, Loeb Classical Library [source]. Seneca, Letters 24.1–2, trans. Richard M. Gummere, Loeb Classical Library [source]; asking “what would I actually do?” is this note’s addition. Joachim Stöber and T. D. Borkovec, Cognitive Therapy and Research 26 (2002), on vagueness in worry [source]. Samaritans, samaritans.org [source].

  • Love Is Not a Mind-Reading Test

    A crystal ball on a wooden stand in a stone niche.

    There’s a sentence that has ended more good evenings than alcohol: If you loved me, you’d know.

    It sounds like a statement about love. It’s really a statement about telepathy, and the evidence on telepathy is not encouraging.

    The psychologist William Ickes spent years measuring what he called empathic accuracy: how well one person can tell what another is thinking and feeling at a given moment. He would record two people talking, then sit each of them down with the tape, ask them to note what they had actually been thinking at various points, and then ask them to guess what the other person had been thinking at theirs. Close friends got it right somewhere between 30 and 40 per cent of the time. Strangers did markedly worse.

    So knowing someone helps. It just doesn’t help enough to pass an exam. And if you loved me, you’d know is an exam, with no syllabus and a pass mark of a hundred.

    Time doesn’t necessarily improve the score. In a 1997 study of 74 married couples, the ones who had been married for less time read each other more accurately, not less. My guess, and it’s only a guess, is that years together build confidence faster than they build accuracy. You stop checking because you think you know. Most of us drive the same way.

    The belief itself seems to cost something. In 1982 two psychologists put together a questionnaire of beliefs that make relationships harder, and one of them was called, plainly, mindreading is expected: a partner should know what you think and feel without being told. More recent work at the University of Manitoba suggests what happens next. In one small study, people who held the belief and imagined being misunderstood were quicker to put it down to a lack of love. In a later study of 142 couples, the more one partner expected to be read, the lower both of them rated the relationship. Both were unpublished theses, and the first used imagined scenes rather than real arguments, so treat them as a hint rather than a verdict. But the hint is consistent. The misunderstanding happens to everyone. The belief turns it into evidence.

    There’s a distinction hiding in here that’s worth keeping. Noticing that someone is upset and knowing what they need are two different skills. Plenty of people are good at the first. You come home with a face, and they see it at once. What they can’t see is whether you want questions or quiet, company or space, soup or a conversation. The rule treats noticing and knowing as one thing, and then marks the other person down for failing at the half nobody can do by looking.

    The usual objection is that care you have to ask for doesn’t count. Asked-for comfort feels second-best. I understand the feeling, and I don’t think it survives a closer look. Asking doesn’t make care worth less. It gives the other person the one thing they can’t get by watching you: information.

    So here’s a small, unromantic suggestion. On a calm day, not a bad one, tell the person you live with one sentence about what helps when you come home like that. Ask me twice. Leave me alone for an hour, then bring tea. Don’t fix it, just listen. One sentence. Then see what happens on the next bad day, and adjust.

    Nobody signed a contract that says love includes telepathy. Most of us enforce it anyway.

    This note comes from Chapter 1 of Nobody Signed This, where the rule goes on trial in full.

    Sources. William Ickes, Everyday Mind Reading (2003), and Linda Stinson and William Ickes, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 62 (1992) [source]; the 30–40 per cent figure is from Ickes’s entry “Empathic Accuracy and Inaccuracy” in Encyclopedia of Human Relationships (2009) [source]. Geoff Thomas, Garth Fletcher and Craig Lange, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 72 (1997) [source]. Roy Eidelson and Norman Epstein, Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 50 (1982) [source]. Justine MacLean, MA thesis (2016), and Justine MacLean Legge, PhD thesis (2022), University of Manitoba [source]. That years together build confidence faster than accuracy is this note’s interpretation.

  • Decide What Failure Looks Like First

    An hourglass, an inkpot with a quill, and a written sheet hanging over the ledge

    Here is a reliable way to succeed at every change you ever try: don’t decide in advance what success would look like.

    It works because people are very good at reading results in their own favour. Once you’ve put time, money or pride into something, almost any outcome can be made to look like progress. The new routine lasted four days? Four more than last month. The course was a disappointment? You learnt what you don’t want. The difficult conversation went badly? At least it’s out in the open. Psychologists have a name for the general habit, confirmation bias, and a large literature showing how many shapes it takes.

    Some of those readings may even be true. The trouble is that you can’t tell which, because you wrote the rules after the game.

    Science has a fix for this, and you can borrow it. More and more researchers now preregister their studies: before collecting any data, they write down what they expect to find and how they’ll judge it, and they put that somewhere public, with a date on it. It’s a promise to their later selves not to cheat. Karl Popper made the underlying point decades ago: a claim that no result could ever count against isn’t a hypothesis. I’d put it less politely. It’s a mood.

    You don’t need a journal to do this. You need a page and two sentences, written before you start.

    It’s working if: …

    It’s failing if: …

    Make them things you could actually observe. Not I’ll feel more confident, but I’ll have spoken up in at least two meetings by the end of the month. Not we’ll get on better, but we’ll have had dinner together three times without an argument. Put a date on the bottom.

    The second sentence is the hard one. Writing down how you might fail feels like inviting it. It isn’t. It’s what lets you notice failure in time to do something about it, instead of explaining it away for another year.

    Two more habits make the page work better.

    Make the change small. A big change, everything at once, has a dull flaw: when something goes wrong, you can’t tell which part was the mistake. Anyone who has fixed a machine knows the rule. Change one thing at a time, then check whether it helped.

    Expect to be wrong sometimes, and don’t cheat when you are. If the failure sentence comes true, that isn’t a disaster. It’s information. You change the plan and keep the direction, or you change the direction. What you don’t do is go back and quietly rewrite the sentence.

    None of this guarantees anything. Plenty of well-designed experiments fail. But a failure you saw coming, on a page you wrote yourself, teaches you something. A failure you explained away teaches you only how to explain the next one.

    If you’re about to change something, write the two sentences tonight. Fold the page. Open it in a month.

    This note comes from Chapter 10 of ARRR, the step of the method where you finally decide what to do.

    Sources. Raymond S. Nickerson, “Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises”, Review of General Psychology 2 (1998) [source]. Brian A. Nosek and others, “The Preregistration Revolution”, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 115 (2018) [source]. Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959; German original 1934) [interpretation]. Applying preregistration to personal decisions is this note’s synthesis.

  • Everyone Is Doing More Than Half

    A pair of scales in a stone niche, one pan weighed down with more coins.

    Ask any couple who does most of the work at home, and you’ll often get two answers that add up to more than a whole.

    This isn’t a joke about marriage. It’s a finding. In 1979 two psychologists, Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, asked married people in Canada to estimate their own share of various household jobs. When they added each couple’s estimates together, the total usually came to more than a hundred per cent. People claimed more than their share not only of the good things but of the bad ones too, such as starting arguments.

    The reason isn’t vanity. You remember your own efforts in detail, because you were there for every one of them. You see only part of your partner’s. Your ledger is written in full colour; theirs is in faded pencil. Later work added a twist: people overclaim mainly on the jobs they do often, and tend to underclaim on the rare ones. The original sample was small, 37 couples, so take the exact numbers lightly. The mechanism is easy enough to check at home.

    Now add the jobs that leave no trace. The sociologist Allison Daminger interviewed 35 couples about what she called the cognitive dimension of household labour: anticipating what’s needed, working out the options, deciding, and checking that it got done. In most of the mixed-sex couples she spoke to, the woman did more of it, especially the anticipating and the checking. Decisions were shared roughly equally. The thinking around them was not.

    Anticipating and checking are almost perfectly invisible. When someone remembers that a child’s shoe size changed in August, nothing happens that anyone could see. When someone puts the bins out, there are bins on the pavement. And it cuts both ways: eleven hours at work and an hour on the road leave no trace in the kitchen either, except a tired person on the sofa.

    The rule most couples live by says this shouldn’t matter: when you love someone, you don’t keep score. The rule has a point. The psychologists Margaret Clark and Judson Mills found that paying back a favour promptly made people like each other more when they expected a business-like relationship, and less when they expected a close one. Invoice every cup of tea and a partnership turns into a small company with two staff and a terrible atmosphere.

    But there’s a difference between counting favours and looking at the load. The first is mean. The second is just accurate. And the rule against counting has a side effect nobody mentions: once the private counting starts, and it often does, the rule doesn’t stop it. It just stops the numbers being read out. Each ledger stays secret, and each one, thanks to Ross and Sicoly, shows its owner in credit.

    If you want to try something, try this. Separately, each of you write down everything it takes to keep your shared life running, paid work and travel included. Put in the thinking jobs: remembering, planning, noticing, checking. Don’t estimate percentages; just list. Then swap, read the other list without comment, and mark anything on it you didn’t know was a job.

    Expect both lists to be longer than you thought. That isn’t a failure. It’s the first accurate picture either of you has had.

    When you say we don’t keep score, it’s worth asking which of two things you mean: I don’t need anything back, or I’d rather not find out.

    This note comes from Chapter 7 of Nobody Signed This, where the rule goes on trial in full.

    Sources. Michael Ross and Fiore Sicoly, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979) [source]. Justin Kruger and Kenneth Savitsky, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 108 (2009) [source]. Allison Daminger, American Sociological Review 84 (2019): 70 interviews with 35 couples; in 26 of the 32 mixed-sex couples the woman did more of the cognitive work [source]. Margaret Clark and Judson Mills, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37 (1979), experiments with students [source]. The distinction between counting favours and looking at the load is this note’s interpretation.